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ABSTRACT
This qualitative phenomenological research study examines language, specifically
the language of diagnosis, and the making of meaning for individuals who have been
diagnosed with bipolar disorder. The study sample consists of six participants who had
received a diagnosis of bipolar disorder three or more years ago. Data were collected
through hour-long, semi-structured interviews with each participant at a single point in
time. Findings revealed three broad themes: (a) The participants’ experience of language,
(b) The participants’ making of meaning, or where strength was found, and (c) The
function of language.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this qualitative phenomenological research study was to explore
the impact of language, specifically the language of diagnosis, and the making of
meaning for individuals who have been diagnosed with bipolar disorder. This study
explored the various ways the language of diagnosis is taken in and understood by
individuals, and the ways in which individuals make meaning of the experience of being
diagnosed with bipolar disorder. The study explored the following research questions:
1. Are there differences in the meaning created by individuals from the experience of
being diagnosed with bipolar disorder?
2. Are there differences in the words used to describe this experience and this diagnosis
by individuals who have received it?
3. Has the language used by professionals informed the meaning created by the
individual?
4. How has language used by professionals informed the meaning created by the
individual?
The history of mental illness in the United States can be thought to parallel the
history of the language surrounding mental illness in the United States. The role of
mental illness in society is deeply politicized, and has been since its first naming of
individuals; the “deranged minds,” “insane,” “madmen;” and when it replaced leprosy as
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society’s scapegoat in the 17th century (Foucault, 1965, p. 7). Throughout history, our
conception of mental illness reflects our philosophical, scientific, and political beliefs and
values: from the religiosity of mental illness to its medicalization, institutionalization and
the psychiatric movement, and to the more recent community mental health movement
(Porter, 2002, pp. 7-9). Roy Porter (2002), in Madness: A brief history, asserts that “the
history of madness properly written would thus be an account not of disease and its
treatment but of questions of freedom and control, knowledge and power.” (p. 3). These
questions of freedom and control, knowledge and power are reflected in language and its
impact on individuals.
This study will be of importance to the practice of social work, and to mental
health clinicians in particular, as it explores the power of language to create experience
and meaning, specifically in terms of mental illness. Work within the social work context
is highly politicized. One aim of this study is to draw attention to the importance of our
developing a greater awareness of the implications of the language we use.
Creating an awareness of the politicization of language may allow us as individual
practitioners to question and challenge our role in the implied power structure. Further,
an awareness of the impact of the language we use may enable us to think creatively
about language and experience it in a way that shifts the power back to the individuals
with whom we work and their lived experience. Understanding the role and the impact of
language on individuals is of vital importance for clinicians, especially as we are often
working with individuals through the medium of language. Most importantly, this study
will be of interest to social workers because it gives us this insight with the words and the
language of the people we care about.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
Literature was reviewed regarding how mental illness has been constructed and
defined historically. Some of the major changes that have impacted how the mentally ill
are viewed; from the introduction of “mental illness” to current Western consciousness in
the 17th century, through institutionalization and deinstitutionalization are also noted. The
current language that is used in the United States to describe and define mental illness is
discussed. More importantly, the literature review provides a vital ‘theory of language’
and meaning-making that informed the researcher’s thoughts and interpretations about
language throughout the study. This ‘theory of language’ primarily focuses on the work
of Jaques Lacan and Michel Foucault. The role of language in creating meaning, its
function in the power dynamics of relationships, and the possibilities it provides for
reclaiming identity and the ‘meaning-making’ of experience are explored.
Historical Articulations of Mental Illness
Various writers have documented the history of mental illness in the Western
world and have related the history of mental illness to its descriptions, definition, and the
language used to describe it (Foucault, 1965; Ghaemi, 2003; Porter, 2002). Concepts of
mental illness have evolved with and, it will be argued, because of the particular, often
politically charged, language employed to describe it. The mentally ill were first defined
as “deranged,” “insane,” “madmen” in the 17th century, and were soon afterwards filling
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the Renaissance’s ‘Ships of Fools’ whose voyages carried its crew from port to port and
city to city (Foucault, 1965, p. 8). In the Western world madness had been allowed “free
reign” and “formed part of the background and language of everyday life” until the
middle of the seventeenth century when “the world of madness was to become the world
of exclusion” (Foucault, 1987, p. 67). Institutions were created to intern the mad, the
poor, the elderly poor, the disabled, beggars, the unemployed, those with venereal
disease, among others; “all those who, in relation to the order of reason, morality and
society, showed signs of ‘derangement’” (Foucault, 1987, p. 67). In this ‘setting apart,’ a
distinction is drawn between the ‘ordered’ and the ‘disordered.’ This distinction
necessarily parallels the political and ideological climate which became one of
emphasizing production and accumulation. Linking all of these interned individuals
together, as well, was their inability to contribute to the production or accumulation of
wealth. From this, we see an example of the changing political vocabulary resulting in the
exclusion of groups of individuals. Interestingly, this physical exclusion is simultaneous
with the creation of a particular language with which to refer to these individuals. Where
the mentally ill had been included in the mundane “language of everyday life” (Foucault,
1987, p. 67), they are now set apart, and the language used to describe and define them is
new, and ‘other-than’ the language of everyday life.
Clearly, this situation was not yet one of treating the ill, but of containing, and
separating from society, “undesirable” individuals. Thus, “madness entered a phase of
silence from which it was not to emerge for a long time; it was deprived of its language;
and although one continued to speak of it, it became impossible for it to speak of itself.”
(Foucault, 1987, p. 69). The language created was not one by and for individuals, but
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without and about, or of, them. In the mid-eighteenth century, internment was reserved
for the mad alone, and “the mad came to be the natural inheritors of internment, the
privileged titulars of the old measures of exclusion.” (Foucault, 1987, p. 70). As well at
this point, a superficial “medicalization” of mental illness was initiated, and physical and
material bonds were replaced by complete and continuous moral and ethical supervision:
In the new world of the asylum, in that world of a punishing morality, madness
became a fact concerning essentially the human soul, its guilt and its freedom; it
was now inscribed within the dimension of interiority; and by that fact, for the
first time in the modern world, madness was to receive psychological status,
structure and signification. But this psychologization was merely the superficial
consequence of a more obscure, more deeply embedded operation – an operation
by which madness was inserted in the system of moral values and repressions.
(p. 72).
State of mind becomes synonymous with the state of the soul. The mad are set apart not
only physically, linguistically, and mentally, but from the interior; the soul, that which
makes us human. From this, we see the multiple and deep layers of ‘othering.’ Foucault
(1987) goes on to make clear the point that descriptions and definitions of mental illness
have historically been politically informed when he states that:
What one discovers under the name of the ‘psychology’ of madness is merely the
result of the operations by which one has invested it. None of this psychology
would exist without the moralizing sadism in which nineteenth-century
‘philanthropy’ enclosed it, under the hypocritical appearances of ‘liberation’.
(p. 73).
Foucault is adamant about the distance between the original language of madness and the
language with which it has been, and is, inscribed within society. He states that, “What is
called ‘mental illness’ is simply alienated madness, alienated in the psychology that it has
itself made possible.”(p. 76). Obviously this is a deep irony, and one that makes the clear
the subjectivity of the mentally ill. Foucault states further that, “One day an attempt must
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be made to study madness as an overall structure – madness freed and disalienated,
restored in some sense to its original language.” (p. 76).
The mapping of the evolution of the concept of mental illness has continuously
paralleled various philosophical and scientific developments; from the religiosity of
mental illness to its medicalization, to institutionalization and the psychiatric movement,
to the current ‘community mental health movement’ (Porter, 2002, pp. 7-9). While
beyond the scope of this study, Foucault asks a poignant question that does beg to be
considered in however limited a way: “How did our culture come to give mental illness
the meaning of deviancy and to the patient a status that excludes him? And how, despite
that fact, does our society express itself in those morbid forms in which it refuses to
recognize itself?” (Foucault, 1987, p. 63). In response to the second question, this study
aims to explore whether or not this expression is, at least in part, in the form of a
pathologizing language.
Current Articulations of Mental Illness
For the most part, in current literature and practice, illness is defined as “the
opposite of health” (Ghaemi, 2003, p. 135), in that, one is defined as healthy until they
display, most often explicitly, manifestations of ill health or illness. In terms of mental
health, Ghaemi cites Aubrey Lewis who first states that “the serviceable criterion
commonly employed to define mental health is the absence of mental illness” (Ghaemi,
2003, p. 137). We can see from the reversibility of the definitions that health and illness
are two ends of the spectrum, whereby one is defined by the absence of the other and
cannot, in these terms, coexist. One is one or one is ‘other.’ In terms of the language, we
see that mental illness is defined in negative relation to mental health. Ghaemi goes
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further with Lewis, who concludes that “Two criteria have apparently been applied, then,
to changes in function: a psychopathological one paying attention to the process, and a
statistical one paying regard to the frequency of its occurrence” (Ghaemi, 2003, p. 137).
In other words, we may see that mental illness is defined by how it deviates from a
“norm,” and how often it does so.
Current research has examined representations of the mentally ill in the mediums
that inform society on a daily basis: children’s stories, the media (Coverdale and Nairn,
2006) and newspaper stories (Corrigan, Watson, Gracia, Slopen, Rasinski, and Hall,
2005), and found that the depictions are most often negative; focusing on denigration,
unpredictability (Coverdale and Nairn, 2006), and violence (Corrigan, Watson, Gracia,
Slopen, Rasinski, and Hall, 2005), serving to “segregate, alienate, and denigrate” the
“crazy, mad, nutty” character (Coverdale and Nairn, 2006, p. 86).
An exploration of mental illness with a focus on the language employed to
describe it, and the implied meaning of the language (i.e. how the mentally ill are
conceptualized by society), will also entail an exploration of the stigmatization of the
mentally ill. Porter (2002) discusses stigmatization in this way:
Stigmatizing – the creation of spoiled identity – involves projecting onto an
individual or group judgments as to what is inferior, repugnant, or disgraceful. It
may thus translate disgust into the disgusting and fears into the fearful, first by
singling out difference, next by calling it inferiority, and finally by blaming
‘victims’ for their otherness. This demonizing process may be regarded as
psychologically and anthropologically driven, arising out of deep-seated and
perhaps unconscious needs to order the world by demarking self from other…
(pp. 62-63)
Stigma is often reinforced by language. Porter sees the power of definition in the hands of
the broader society and not with individuals who experience mental illness. Definitions of
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mental illness are “psychologically and anthropologically driven” by the majority.
Foucault (1987) makes a similar point concerning the deep structures of society when he
states that: “The recognition that enables one to say, ‘This man is mad,’ is neither a
simple nor an immediate act. It is based in fact on a number of earlier operations and
above all on the dividing up social space according to the lines of valuation and
exclusion.” (p. 78). Thus, it is possible to see the connection between the power of
construction in language (who gets to do the defining, and why) and the effects (one of
which is stigmatization) of the (mis)use of this power.
This kind of exploration is important because the language of health and mental
health are so entwined with political ideologies and are often framed in metaphorical
terms: “Like all metaphors, political and economic metaphors can hide aspects of reality”
(Lakoff and Johnson, 2003, p. 236), and thus constrain aspects of our lives. In using a
particular language, or particular words, to describe and define mental illness, we leave
others out. In so doing, it seems, we may contribute to the alienation of individuals from
their own experience. This is not only historically the case, but continues to be, as is
demonstrated by current definitions of mental illness as fundamentally the absence of
health, and depictions of the mentally ill as uncontrollable, disordered, disturbed, and
disgraceful.
Current Mental Health Policy and Language
Considering the language of recent national mental health policy necessitates the,
albeit brief, consideration of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Olmstead v.
L.C. decision and the New Freedom Initiative.
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The Americans with Disabilities Act was introduced by the Department of Justice
as a federal policy initiative in 1990. The ADA “has made employment, public
accommodation, information technology, telecommunication services, housing, school,
transportation and polling places all dramatically more accessible” (U. S. Department of
Justice, p. i) to individuals with disabilities, including mental illness.
In 1999, the Supreme Court’s Olmstead v. L.C. decision “held that unnecessary
institutionalization of individuals with disabilities is a form of discrimination prohibited
by Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The decision affirmed that
states have an obligation to move individuals with disabilities from institutional settings
into more integrated settings in the community if moving them would not fundamentally
alter the states’ service systems.” (Mathis, 2004). However, compliance with the
Olmstead decision has been has not been consistent and is not without its challenges.
Many states cite a ‘dismal fiscal situation’ as the major barrier to compliance, and
movement into the community is still largely viewed as a depletion of resources (Mathis,
2004). While it “has been the most viable avenue for many people with disabilities to
obtain desperately desired liberation from institutional environments and receive needed
community services,” it is still true that “startlingly little movement has occurred” and
“the number of individuals with disabilities who remain unnecessarily institutionalized is
staggering.” (Mathis, 2004).
A call for stronger enforcement of the ADA, The New Freedom Initiative was
announced in 2001 and “laid out a comprehensive set of goals and plan of action to
eliminate the remaining barriers to full participation by people with disabilities in
American life.” (U. S. Deptartment of Justice, p.1)
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The New Freedom Commission on Mental Health’s interim report deemed that
the current system is “not oriented to the single most important goal of the people it
serves – the hope of recovery.” (President’s New Freedom Commission, 2002, p. 5). We
may infer from this that there is something socially functional about the maintenance of
illness. The New Freedom Commission on Mental Health therefore calls for a
fundamental “transformation” in the delivery of mental health care across the country.
Articulated in the Commission’s Executive Report is the proposition that shifting the goal
and outcome of treatment to one of recovery will fundamentally work towards reducing
the stigma of mental illness (President’s New Freedom Commission, 2002, p. 6). The
goals of a transformed mental health care system are: (a) to achieve an understanding that
mental health is essential to overall health; (b) for mental health care to be consumer and
family-driven; (c) to eliminate the disparities in the mental health system; (d) to ensure
that early mental health screening, assessment, and referral to services are common
practice; (e) the delivery of excellent mental health care and acceleration of research; and
(f) the technology be used to access mental health care and information (President’s New
Freedom Commission, 2002, p. 8).
The Mental Health Surgeon General’s Report calls for policy development that
would: (a) continue to build the science base and promote research; (b) reduce the stigma
associated with mental illness; (c) increase public awareness of effective treatment for
mental illness; (d) ensure a “supply of mental health services” that are consumeroriented; (e) ensure the delivery of services and treatment to communities; (f) support
“tailored-treatment” that considers age, gender, race and culture; and (g) reduce barriers
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to the treatment of mental illness (U.S. Department of Health and Human Service, 1999,
pp. 453-457).
Generally, these are national initiatives that are attempting to shift the language of
policy from one of illness and treatment to one of treatment and recovery. As well, they
are initiatives that reflect the philosophical turn that has slowly been struggling to take
hold, perhaps since The Community Mental Health Act of 1963; where a language of
institutionalization, rooted in procedural expectations and the medicalization of illness
gives way to a language including ‘community-based care,’ ‘consumer-driven
initiatives,’ and ‘empowerment.’
In contrast to recent national initiatives, current research has explored state
legislation that affects those with mental illness by pinpointing legislation that impacts:
liberties, protection from discrimination and privacy rights of the mentally ill (Corrigan,
Watson, Heyrman, Warpinski, Gracia, Slopen, & Hall, 2005). Interestingly, this research
also found that current legislation, for the most part, only takes into account the diagnosis
of a mental illness. It does not often take into account individual issues of competence or
incompetence; the implication being that an individual with a diagnosis of a mental
illness is assumed to be incompetent. In other words, legislation itself seems to make a
judgment based on a label, a diagnosis, without consideration of anything more specific.
The individual is thus disregarded (perhaps for the sake of efficiency) in the act of
labeling.
Some current policy as implemented, therefore, may be seen as standing in
contrast to the expressed desires of people living with a mental illness:
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Consumers and psychiatric survivors appear to want qualitative changes in the mental
health system— changes that have to do with a fundamental alteration in the nature of
both the macro-level power contract (how the entire mental health system operates) and
the micro-level power contract (how professionals help their patients and clients).
(Everett, 2000, p. 185).
Everett goes on to describe mental health policy’s inefficacy, despite these desires for
change:
However, as professionals, I and my colleagues were unable to provide these sorts
of supports and, instead, translated patients’ expression of suffering into a
psychiatric diagnosis which, in turn, led to things like hospitalization, medication
and ECT, marginalization, poverty, unsafe and inferior housing, violence and
many of the other hard realities that typify patients’ lives. In fact, respondents
repeatedly charge that professionals miss the point, fail to help and actually make
their problems worse through the trauma of involuntary treatment and the stigma
of psychiatric diagnosis. (Everett, 2000, p. 197)
This makes clear the imposed distance between the mentally ill individual and the ‘rest of
the world.’ It is as if they speak another language than the professionals. Also important
here is acknowledging the intersections of oppression, where mental health issues are
often compounded by issues of poverty, poor housing, abuse and unemployment. Policies
in each of these areas may affect mentally ill individuals in a profound way. So we see
the intersection of various and multiple policy areas, each with their own politically
informed languages, with the lives of individuals. There is a ‘setting apart’ in current
mental health policy, which is perhaps compounded by its intersections with other policy
areas, and this echoes Foucault’s recognition that “our society does not wish to recognize
itself in the ill individual whom it rejects or locks up; as it diagnoses the illness, it
excludes the patient” (Foucault, 1987, p. 63).
National initiatives like the ADA and the New Freedom Initiative, however, have
sounded hopeful, and indeed have provided hope, that policy may effectively be informed
by the experience of individuals, and in this way can initiate relevant and lasting change.
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At the same time, it may be continually important to remember that policy initiatives
seem initially to reflect the political climate and the intended changes are not necessarily
operationalized as envisioned.
Language and the Making of Meaning
Lacan asserts the importance of articulation, specifically of verbalizing. He states
that in the articulating, one has “made it pass into the verbe, or, more precisely, into the
epos by which he brings back into present time the origins of his own person” (Lacan,
1977, p. 47). ‘Verbe’ and ‘epos’ here mean ‘the Word’ and ‘the word,’ respectively. So
we see the raw power of language, the potential for creativity; the creation of self, in the
beginning, and quite possibly recovering oneself as well. Lacan states as well that, “If the
domain defined by this gift of speech is to be sufficient for your action as also for your
knowledge, it will also be sufficient for your devotion. For it offers it a privileged field”
(Lacan, 1977, p. 106). In a manner too profound for the researcher’s attempt, eliciting
and honoring the words of individuals who are so much more often affected than
affecting, is an attempt to bring them back into the privilege of their own experience.
However, it is also fundamental to Lacanian analysis that we recognize language, and the
act of speaking, or articulating, as fundamentally alienating; taking us further from, and
truly obscuring, what we desire.
Developmentally, for Lacan, it is the going through and into language that
introduces us for the first time to the idea of loss and absence in the world. Language is
castrating: “Speaking thus separates us from what we want. Entering the register of
language, of the signifier, does this not by chance but by necessity: it is a structural
feature of language that it will distort whatever message we have” (Leader & Groves,
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2005, p. 99). This entrance is as necessary and it is alienating. Judith Butler articulates a
similar point when she asks: “Is our vulnerability to language a consequence of our being
constituted within its terms?” (Butler, 1997, p. 2). The individual’s entry into language is
also their entry into subjectivity, which is to be “enmeshed in the endless web of
signification” (Cobley, 1997, p. 83). This occurs on an individual level, but it parallels
Foucault’s account of madness in the “new world of the asylum” receiving
“psychological status, structure and signification” (Foucault, 1987, p. 72). On this
broader level, we can see how a diagnosis enmeshes an individual into the world of
signification that is mental health, mental illness, and mental health policy; and that this
is not one’s doing, but rather, what is done.
Language does, at the same time, profoundly inform how we interact with and
interpret the world, and how we know one another. Particularly in the fields of clinical
social work, psychotherapy and psychoanalysis, we pay attention to the processes of
language; as words are repeated, and where there is rupture and distortion in language as
it is expressed. For Lacan and in psychoanalysis, this plays out again in transference:
“The more the subject finds alienation in speech, the more he separates from it to find
refuge in the phantasy relation to the object” (Leader & Groves, 2005, p. 139). We
experience in the transference the oscillation between speech and silence as the
oscillation between separation and relation. Obviously, this contributes a great deal of
complexity in considering how language is used and its impact on the individual.
A Foucauldian notion of language necessarily involves an examination of power
and domination. Jerry Floersch (2000) points to Foucault’s signature concept of
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‘biopower,’ and relates it to the work that is done each day in the fields of social work
and mental health care:
Biopower refers… to the myriad of ways that dominant discourses on gender,
sexuality, ethnicity, and work, become taken for granted, normalized, and
internalized; the individual becomes the subject dictated by the dominant
discourse. And it is in this way that biopower includes practitioners’ “dividing
practices” (e.g., assessment and diagnostic schemes) that work to place the clients
either inside a normal circle of behavior or outside, among the abnormal. (p. 3)
Where Lacan emphasizes language’s role in our experiencing of subjectivity, Foucault
begins to point to the systems that we are subjected to by language. Everett (2000) has
also implicated social work in these detrimentally divisive practices:
The role of rehabilitation is to exert a powerful socialization process that first
severs people from their personal histories and then redefines them in the
language of disability and handicap— a role that is reminiscent of the
Foucauldian view of medicine and psychiatry. The skills people learn during the
rehabilitation process are those appropriate to being a ‘‘good’’ patient— someone
who is easy to manage, dependent and ignorant of his or her rights— an agenda
that appears to be the precise opposite of the consumer and survivor vision of a
power contract based on self-empowerment and liberating power relations. (p.
201)
These divisions take place along the lines of language and the meaning language
acquires.
Foucault (1994) asks:
How is it that words, which in their primary essence names and designations, and
which are articulated just as representation itself is analyzed, can move irresistibly
away from their original signification and acquire either a broader or more limited
adjacent meaning?” (p. 110)
He has previously intimated a part answer to this question when he discusses one
common, but not the only, process of classification: “By a horizontal articulation,
grouping together individuals that have certain identities in common and separating those
that are different; such articulation then forms a sequential generalization of groups
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growing gradually larger and larger (and less and less numerous).” (Foucault, 1994, p.
97).
Hacking (2004) has cited the importance of a Foucauldian perspective in
“understanding how classifications of people interact with the people classified” (p. 277).
Hacking (1999) understands that, “All our acts are under descriptions, and the acts that
are open to us depend, in a purely formal way, on the descriptions available to us.” (p.
31). Again, this interaction, or intersection, is vital to exploring how language is
experienced by individuals and how that experience is understood. Hacking (1999) writes
that:
‘Interactive’ is a new concept that applies not to people but to classifications, to
kinds, to the kinds that can influence what is classified. And because kinds can
interact with what is classified, the classification itself may be modified or
replaced… the interaction occurs in the larger matrix of institutions and practices
surrounding classification (p. 103)
He is particularly concerned with “classifications that, when known by people or those
around them, and put to work in institutions, change the ways in which individuals
experience themselves – and may even lead people to evolve their feelings and behavior
in part because they are so classified” (Hacking, 1999, p. 104).
The importance of the meaning an individual makes is articulated by Foucault
when he asserts that, “The way in which a subject accepts or rejects his illness, the way in
which he interprets it and gives signification to its most absurd forms, constitutes one of
the essential dimensions of the illness.” (Foucault, 1987, p. 47). In an important way,
Foucault acknowledges the subject as also acting, and as being part of what is constituted.
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The Impact of Language on Individuals Diagnosed with Bipolar Disorder
and the Making of Meaning
Everett’s (2000) study includes some important preliminary points about how
individuals diagnosed with a mental illness articulate their experience and their
(dis)comfort with the language that has been imposed on them. She points out that they
define mental illness tentatively and this may imply that they understand the seriousness
of the meanings (p. 189). One of her respondents said:
This thing that we’ve labeled mental illness is really just sadness and
discouragement. These feelings have a natural function…[but] we end up with a
whole bunch of people saying there’s something wrong with the way that we’re
behaving and medicalizing it so that we have diseases (p. 189)
Another respondent states that: “I think people have to develop their own understanding
of their experience” (Everett, 2000, p. 189).
George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (2003) point to both the complexity and the
individuality of meaning-making:
Truth is always relative to understanding, which is based on a nonuniversal
conceptual system… what is significant for me will not depend on my rational
knowledge alone but on my past experiences, values, feelings, and intuitive
insights. Meaning is not cut and dried; it is a matter of imagination and a matter of
constructing coherence” (p. 227).
This is echoed by Hacking (1999) who cites Hilary Putnam statement that there is a
“common philosophical error of supposing that ‘reality’ must refer to a single super
thing, instead of looking at the ways in which we endlessly renegotiate – and are forced
to renegotiate – our notion of reality as our language and life develops” (p. 101). Lakoff
and Johnson put forth an idea of the ‘experientialist myth,’ as a way by which to work
from the middle-ground between rational knowledge and subjective desire. In describing
the ‘experientialist myth,’ they go on to say that:
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Its emphasis on interaction and interactional properties shows how meaning
always is meaning to a person. And its emphasis on the construction of coherence
via experiential gestalts provides an account of what it means for something to be
significant to an individual. Moreover, it gives an account of how understanding
uses the primary resources of the imagination via metaphor and how it is possible
to give experience new meaning and to create new realities (Lakoff & Johnson,
2003, p. 228)
The experientialist myth acknowledges an individual’s interaction with their environment
and envisions this interaction to be one of mutual exchange. The process is described as
such:
The nature of our bodies and our physical and cultural environment imposes a
structure on our experience… Recurrent experience leads to the formation of
categories, which are experiential gestalts with those natural dimensions. Such
gestalts define coherence in our experience. We understand our experience
directly when we see it as being structured coherently in terms of gestalts that
have emerged directly from interaction with and in our environment. We
understand experience metaphorically when we use a gestalt from one domain of
experience to structure experience in another domain (Lakoff & Johnson, 2003, p.
230).
This occurs within the self, where “self-understanding involves consciously recognizing
previously unconscious metaphors and how we live by them” (Lakoff & Johnson, 2003,
p. 233), but also in communication between individuals or groups of individuals.
Meaning is not to be taken for granted, rather, meaning is negotiated.
Importantly, the meaning we have made of our experiences emerges in our
language and speech, but also in our actions: “Our implicit and typically unconscious
conceptions of ourselves and the values that we live by are perhaps most strongly
reflected in the little things we do over and over, that is, in the casual rituals that have
emerged spontaneously in our daily lives” (Lakoff & Johnson, 2003, p. 235). Foucault
reiterates this notion by acknowledging that “mental illness effaces, but it also
emphasizes; on the one hand it suppresses, but on the other, it accentuates…” so that “the
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essence of mental illness lies not only in the void that it hollows out, but also in the
positive plentitude of activities of replacement that fill that void” (Foucault, 1987, p. 17).
So an exploration of meaning-making involves not only what one says about their
experience, but how they illustrate this meaning in the activity of their lives.
Summary
This literature review addressed each aspect of the research question by exploring
current mental health research and policy language, as well as establishing an informative
theoretical stance. Prior literatures provided this study’s framework for the following:
(a) the qualitative interviews with individuals who have been diagnosed with bipolar
disorder and (b) the exploration of the meaning they have created as “diagnosed”
individuals.
The study explored the following research questions:
1. Are there differences in the meaning created by individuals from the experience of
being diagnosed with bipolar disorder?
2. Are there differences in the words used to describe this experience and this diagnosis
by individuals who have received it?
3. Has the language used by professionals informed the meaning created by the
individual?
4. How has language used by professionals informed the meaning created by the
individual?
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CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
This research study explored the way in which language, specifically the language
of diagnosis, does or does not impact individuals who have been diagnosed with bipolar
disorder. The main research questions explored are as follows:
1. Are there differences in the meaning created by individuals from the experience of
being diagnosed with bipolar disorder?
2. Are there differences in the words used to describe this experience and this diagnosis
by individuals who have received it?
3. Has the language used by professionals informed the meaning created by the
individual?
4. How has language used by professionals informed the meaning created by the
individual?
Flexible methodology was used in this qualitative study. It is understood that in
flexible method research, “unstructured data are used in order to capture the phenomena
of interest in the words or actions of those who embody or live them and to capture them
in context in terms that are ‘experience-near’ as possible” (Anastas, 1999, p. 57). The
design philosophically reflects the research questions being explored. The main purpose
in employing a qualitative design and flexible method was to draw out the participants’
experience and voice, as this is what constitutes the meaning and is the purpose of the
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study. The researcher was interested in the language and meaning-creation of the
participants and, as such, prioritized the use of participants’ voice, verbatim accounts,
open-ended questions, and interviews as “naturalistic” as possible (Anastas, 1999, p. 62).
As well, this research was dependent “on analytic generalization for [its] validity rather
than on demographic representativeness”, as is consistent with its flexible design
(Anastas, 1999, p. 276). The researcher used nonrandom purposive snowball sampling to
recruit participants for the study.
The Interview Guide (see Appendix D) was composed of semi-structured, openended questions that aimed to facilitate individual narrative. The audio taped discussions
were thematically and “linguistically” interpreted by the researcher. This decision, as
well, was made in order that the occurrence of the interview itself, its progression and the
experience of it, would be largely informed by the narrative of the participant. This
research study did not explicitly aim to measure the phenomena of the impact of
language, but to explore the tenability of this thesis (i.e. the impact of language) in terms
of lived experience, as narrated.
Sample
Inclusion criteria for participants in this study are as follows: (a) over 18 years of
age; (b) diagnosed with bipolar disorder for a period of at least three years; and (c) in
current stable mental and emotional health.
6 participants were interviewed for one hour each. Participants ranged in age from
29-69 years with a mean age of 55.3 years. Four participants were female and two were
male. Their racial and ethnic representation included five Caucasian participants and one
of mixed race/ethnicity. Participants had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder between 4-
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31 years, with a mean of 17.3 years since diagnosis. Nonrandom purposive snowball
sampling was used because of the vulnerability of the population and the specificity of
the topic. Participants were initially recruited through National Alliance on Mental Illness
(NAMI) DuPage Chapter, and the Depression and Bipolar Support Alliance (DBSA) in
Chicago, Illinois. These organizations signed a letter of permission allowing research to
take place through their agency (see Appendix E: Agency Letter of Permission). A flyer
describing the study was distributed through each of these organizations which allowed
participants to be self-selecting, i.e. they contacted the researcher if they were interested
or had questions. The researcher also went to a Speaker’s Bureau meeting at NAMIDuPage to informally discuss the study and seek participants.
This being said, many of the participants had experience in supportive programs
and had been engaged in advocacy work. While in some ways this limited the diversity of
the respondents and their experience, it also provided a responsible safeguard against
recruiting participants who were particularly vulnerable or unstable. It also may be seen
as strengthening the study because it ensured that the participants were articulate and
thoughtful about their diagnosis and their experience of it. After each interview, the
participants were asked to let anyone they thought might be interested in being
interviewed know that they could contact the researcher for an interview. This was the
operationalization of the snowball.
Data Collection
The application for approval to conduct this study was received in February 2007
from the Human Subjects Review Committee at Smith College. The HSRA outlines this
study’s adherence to Federal Guidelines protecting participant confidentiality. The
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interviews were audio-taped and notes were taken by the researcher. The researcher
transcribed the interviews. The research advisor had access to the data after all
identifying information was removed. Audiotapes of the interviews have been kept in a
locked filing cabinet in the researcher’s office. All tapes and files were number coded. No
identifying information was used to mark tapes or files, and all audiotapes will be
destroyed after a period of three years (2010). The Informed Consent forms (see
Appendix A: Informed Consent Form) have been kept separate from all interview data.
However, consent forms and the corresponding data are connected by a code, so that the
data is traceable in the event that any participant decided to withdraw from the study.
While the participants’ words appear verbatim throughout the study, their real names
have not been used and all details have been disguised. The content of the interviews will
not be discussed in any way that identifies the participants, unless there is disclosure of
impending harm.
Interviews were conducted in-person, audio-taped and then transcribed. Each
interview was an hour long. Interviews took place in a neutral, quiet place that respected
the participants’ confidentiality. The Interview Guide contained a script that was used for
clarifying the goal of the study. The Interview Guide consists of open-ended questions,
and while there was a general outline in terms of the order in which themes were covered,
the interviewer was flexible and responsive to the narration of the participant.
Individuals contacted the researcher by email or telephone to express interest in
participating in the study. Participants and the researcher agreed upon a time and place to
conduct the interview (see Appendix B: Recruitment Flier). Participants were informed
that the interview would last one hour and their commitment would be no more than one
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hour and fifteen minutes. The informed consent procedures were discussed with all
participants prior to the initial meeting. The Informed Consent document was sent to any
participant who requested it prior to the interview. At the beginning of each interview
session, the participant signed two Informed Consent forms (one for their own records
and one for the researcher’s records) and completed a short demographics survey (see
Appendix C: Demographic Survey). After completion of these two documents, the
interviews started with the researcher’s script clarifying the study topic; interviews were
recorded via audio-tape.
Data Analysis
The data collected from participant interviews were inductively analyzed: (a)
thematically and (b) linguistically. The researcher made extensive memos on each
transcription, clarifying what themes and issues had emerged within the interview and
how those themes related to previous emerging themes, and the language used to express
them. The coding of material evolved as the interviews continued in this way and drafts
were made of potential codes. One potential weakness in this method is that it implies
that the order in which the information was encountered influences the analysis. To
counter this likelihood, emerging themes are discussed by the researcher, as they are
related to the study, from the interviews with the research advisor, colleagues, and peer
commentators in order to “check out” the developing analysis. This “checking-out”
enhanced the reliability, or credibility, and trustworthiness of this study. Reliability was
also enhanced with the availability of an audit-trail. The consent forms, the transcribed
interviews, the notes of the researcher after each interview, the memos on the transcribed
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interviews containing early theme identification and the theme word files are all
components of the audit trail.
Once emerging themes had been clarified, grouping the themes was possible and
larger themes were identified. Computer programs such as N-Vivo or Nudist were not
necessary for this study because of its small data set. Instead, the researcher identified
segments of the narrated text that expressed each theme and copied these segments into a
new word file for the particular theme. At this stage, the researcher began to discern the
best label to describe the theme and all of its components. Then, the researcher selected
quotations that particularly illustrated or exemplified the theme, from the thematic word
file, and used these quotations as the basis of the Findings Chapter of this research study.
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CHAPTER IV
FINDINGS
This qualitative phenomenological research study explored the language of
diagnosis and its perceived impact on individuals diagnosed with bipolar disorder. The
primary research questions being explored were:
1. Are there differences in the meaning created by individuals from the experience of
being diagnosed with bipolar disorder?
2. Are there differences in the words used to describe this experience and this diagnosis
by individuals who have received it?
3. Has the language used by professionals informed the meaning created by the
individual?
4. How has language used by professionals informed the meaning created by the
individual?
Data were collected through interviews with six participants. However, the
interviews were flexible and relatively responsive to each participant and there was a
stated openness to the experience of the individual participant. Therefore the interviews
largely explored: (a) the experience of diagnosis and (b) the participants’ thoughts and
ideas about how and if language had impacted that experience. When unexpected and
interesting themes emerged in the interviews, these themes were allowed and explored
over and above an adherence to the Interview Guide.

26

Analysis of the data revealed the broad themes of: (a) the participants’ experience
of language; (b) their making of meaning, or where strength was found; and (c) the
function of language.
The participants’ experience of language was further analyzed to reveal the
following themes: (a) language as naming, labeling or categorizing; (b) language as
relating to personal experience; (c) language as relating to acceptance of the diagnosis;
and (d) language as used by the participants. The function of language was further
analyzed to reveal the following themes: (a) language sets apart or “others;” (b) language
creates a dichotomy, specifically between mental and physical illness; and (c) language
as cultural expression and as reflected in media representation. These themes point to the
various ways that language may, in part, both impact and create our experiences.
Admittedly, with this study’s theme being language, a unique complexity emerged in
terms of identifying themes and, in fact, giving these themes, themselves, a name or
label. For this reason, and because interviews were unstructured and flexible, the themes
are broadly identified, overlap a great deal, and verbatim accounts have been privileged
wherever possible throughout this chapter. This chapter is divided into ten sections.
Description of Sample
The sample included six individuals who have been diagnosed with bipolar
disorder and who met all other inclusion criteria. Three participants were recruited
through the DuPage Chapter of the National Alliance on Mental Illness; one was
recruited through the Depression and Bipolar Support Alliance of Greater Chicago; one
was recruited through snowball sampling; and one was recruited through personal
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‘acquaitanceship’. Interviews were conducted in varied physical facilities to protect the
confidentiality of all participants.
The age range of participants was 29-69 years, with a mean of 55.3 years. There
were four female participants and two male participants. The demographic survey
included questions of age, gender, race/ethnicity, religion, approximate annual gross
income, highest level of completed education, and number of years diagnosed with
bipolar disorder. Five participants described their race/ethnicity as white or Caucasian
and one described mixed race/ethnicity. Four participants reported being Christian (one
identified Anglican, one identified Roman Catholic), one participant responded “not
applicable” and one declined to report an identified religion. The approximate annual
gross income of participants ranged from $500.00- $55,000.00 with a mean income of
$36,100.00. One participant chose not to divulge their approximate annual gross income.
All participants reported their highest level of education completed; responses included:
M.B.A. (two participants), one B.S., one PhD, one M.S., and one “college” level.
Although it was not requested, it was revealed through the interviews that five
participants were married and one was divorced. The number of years since being
diagnosed with bipolar ranged from 4-31 years, with a mean of 17.5 years since
diagnosis. It is important to note that because of the average age and number of years
since diagnosis, many participants had initially received a diagnosis of “manic depressive
disorder” which was later named bipolar disorder.
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The Experience of Language
Language as Naming, Labeling or Categorizing
All participants articulated their reaction to a diagnosis of bipolar disorder
considering the felt seriousness of the diagnosis and the connotations the diagnosis
implied:
To me, the concept of, or the words bipolar, means that you’re really sick, and
obviously a lot of derogatory thoughts are associated with that.
I thought it was crazy, I mean, it was very offensive. The word, the manic, mania,
maniacal, ah, maniac kind of connotations. That was very, very negative to me. I
found it very offensive.
You don’t want to be called crazy, because crazy is too cartoonish, you know, it’s
almost not-real, because crazy has so many different connotations.
He said the diagnosis was manic-depression, and at the time I was so surprised by
that. I was thinking, no, I’m not that bad. And again, it just shows the power of
that label… I thought, my God, if someone reads that they’ll think I’m crazy, you
know… they’ll have less respect for me. So it put it into a whole different
category than just being depressive.
I kept pushing that term away because I knew it was more, ah, I didn’t want to
admit that, and the implications, ‘cause I lose control going down, I lose control
going up, you know?
It was revealed as well that there is something attractive about not naming or labeling the
condition:
I like the idea of this doctor saying ‘let’s not worry about the labels’, you know,
let’s just get into it and find out what’s going on with you and your mind, and
what we can do about it.
There are also positive aspects to the naming of experience. Two of the six participants
articulated this clearly. Naming can provide relief, by way of an explanation of
experiences, and in this way can ease the burden of a sense of guilt:
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Now when I look back I wish I had known, because, well back then there
probably wouldn’t be as much treatment, but this thing’s ongoing within me and
then you feel guilty because you’re not producing, and I wasn’t studying as much,
but the reason I wasn’t studying is because I was overcome by depression. It was
only about ten years ago that I figured it out.” Calling it something, naming the
experience, “helped me then to put, to give a sense, yeah, this is the process that
I’ve been going through since I was 19-20 years old, it’s a legitimate, it’s a valid,
process from which I have suffered greatly. And it was a relief to me at that point
to say now I know why, what was going on back there…because it took some of
the stigma off when I wasn’t able to perform as well… it was freeing because it
gave some reason…
I was relieved, and I realize that’s not the case for other people, for me, I heard
those words and it was accepted at that very moment… I felt like it was an
answer, I appreciated in terms of the fact that it was medical terminology, I was
comforted by that, rather than someone just making a vague description of what I
had or what I was diagnosed with… so I didn’t feel odd at that point, like it was
OK… I then had an answer, an explanation, not an excuse, but an actual
understanding of why I did these things that were just, you know… not me.
Differing views were expressed in regards to specific names, or labels, and what they
imply to individuals:
I knew that I was subject to cycles, cycling, but it’s one thing to say cycling and
another thing to say manic depression.
The fact that I’m bipolar has less emotional impact than to say I’m manicdepressive. ‘Cause manic’s a pretty strong word.
Why is it OK for someone to have, um, even if you use manic-depression, which
is bipolar disorder, I mean, even if you use that word it’s different than using its
alias?
The emotional weight of the diagnosis comes across clearly, especially as it relates to
depression, which in the cases of most participants had not only been a previous
diagnosis but also how they had come to think of themselves:
I’ve always felt that manic depression is a term which has more emotional weight
to it than depression. When you think of people with manic depression, now it’s
bipolar, it’s a more painful diagnosis because not only do you suffer terrible
depressions, you have to be careful not to go too high…
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See depression is something everyman can relate to. Everyone’s been sad,
everyone’s had some sort of bout of depression, of sadness, or whatever, this is
something relate-able. So if you can tell someone that you suffer from depression,
it’s much more easily accepted. If you tell someone you’re bipolar, they get all
bent out of shape. Because they’re afraid, because they think they’ve never
encountered bipolar people before, but more than likely they have and didn’t
know it. So that, the stigma, is one of the reasons that people are reluctant to
accept a diagnosis of bipolar.
The vulnerability of language, or labels, to carry-over meaning came across, particularly
when there was discussion about the renaming of manic-depressive disorder to bipolar
disorder:
They changed it from manic-depression, they changed it to bipolar, now
everybody’s bipolar, and you hear it everywhere, you know? So it’s like, why
change it? It didn’t serve it’s purpose, if the purpose of changing away from
manic-depression was ‘cause manic-depression had such a bad rap, then bipolar
already had that bad rap or worse…
Despite the complexities and the difficulty of hearing a diagnosis of bipolar disorder, it
also came across throughout the interviews that there is value and importance in giving
experience a name:
Language can hopefully help other people when they’re going through it to
provide some understanding and for their families or what’s going on…
Most people are interested in having something given a name, somewhere you
gotta put a hook on it, a label on it.
The most accurate way, and the most reasonable way, to deal with it is to define it
as it is and let it be that.
Don’t dress something up, why are we afraid to call something what it is?
Language as Relating to Personal Experience
More personal complexities arose when language was thought about in relation to
what are often profoundly difficult and challenging experiences of living with mental
illness:
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What happens is often there’s a denial process going on, sometimes, it’s hard to
put a label on things sometimes.
It’s very difficult… Ah, and we’re dishonored. And we’re talking about bipolar
here, it’s at the heart of who you are… and your emotions, your perceptions of
yourself and how people react to you and the stigmas involved, it cuts to your
heart you know? You have to fight to keep a sense of self-esteem or respect for
yourself because everyone else is saying, at different times, and in culture, you
know, ‘the other’…
Call it manic depression or call it bipolar, all I know is when you have severe
depression, you have it. You can’t get out of bed, just in constant agony, you
don’t know why, you go through all kinds of feelings, ah, but the language
becomes important… but I tend to have to agree that most people the doctors are
dealing with, ah, especially at that time when they’re suffering with the illness, to
go into a lot of detail on semantics is not where one ought to dwell.
It became clear that there was more positive regard for the language of diagnosis when it
was felt to reflect personal experience. Of course, conversely, there is a reluctance to take
on the language of diagnosis when it is not felt to reflect personal experience:
The problem with the diagnosis and the label and the words is they don’t take into
account what may’ve caused it. That’s the big… that I would prefer a diagnosis of
‘reactive’… or something like that in there, that would’ve been a big asset and
help to me.
All I heard was random cycling, short cycling, ups and downs, unexplained, no
reason, and I’m like, I can’t relate to this, you know, I don’t think I have that, but
now I hear more about triggers… ‘triggers’ is helpful, ‘reactive’ is helpful. I
mean, if it’s true, for somebody that it’s not, it’s not.
Bipolar is unlike schizophrenia or schizoaffective. Those words, how do they
describe? Versus bipolar, it’s inherent, it’s two poles, I mean the opposite, you
know, mania and/or elation and depression. I mean, it’s a term that makes sense…
that’s an accurate description of what the illness is about.
The difficulty of trying to talk about specific language when it relates so intimately to the
participants’ lived experience was often apparent:
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I think that I am that, so I don’t think it’s come to mean anything. It’s like an
answer… it’s part of me, I mean, that is. So I don’t really… and it’s not for lack
of not thinking about it, I don’t see it as anything more than just an illness.
Language as Relating to Acceptance of the Diagnosis
Connected with the degree to which the language of diagnosis was felt to reflect
personal experience, identifying with the language of diagnosis may also be seen to
reflect a struggle with the acceptance of diagnosis. Another way of saying this could be
that a reluctance to accept the diagnosis is a reluctance to accept the implications of that
diagnosis, and this is evident in a reluctance to take on a word, a label, of bipolar as part
of oneself:
I wanted to be me, you know, I wanted to be OK. And I had a lot of denial…
Denying the diagnosis itself, but more denying the need for any kind of
medication and hoping that I could stay well, which I sometimes did for five years
at a time, out of the hospital, working, doing fine…
I’m in the center a lot too, I’m not wildly bouncing back and forth between two
poles. So, I’m not really sure, it took me a long time to get comfortable with even
believing that this is what I have, you know, because I never considered myself a
‘moody’ person.
I imagine there’s more of a stigma in our society to manic depression than
depression, so yeah, that label or diagnosis I was very reluctant to take on, even
though the evidence was very clear.
Two of the six participants did not feel themselves to be entirely accepting of their
“diagnosis,” but did understand it as something that they were living with. One
participant in particular did not think in terms of acceptance. She said:
You think, when you think of acceptance, you think… I feel resigned to it.
The power, and the implications, of articulating were clear. In terms of a diagnosis, to
take it on and to attribute it out loud to oneself, may represent a more full acceptance:
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To know it on one level, and then accept the diagnosis on another level, are two
different things.
I think to truly accept, to truly accept, what you have, you need to accept only the
ramifications, what it means, what it tangibly means, but you also have to accept
it’s label. I mean, but I don’t think… I think that’s a harder thing for people. I
think people can accept who they are and what it means, how it’s gonna affect
them in the future, how it affects them now, what their needs are, what
medications… but to accept that name, I think that’s hard.
I really truly do not believe that people can accept their illness until they can
accept what it’s called and the ramifications, the words, all the words, associated
with it. You know, paranoia and mania, and you know… I don’t know how you
can accept your illness and not be able to handle that.
Language as Used by the Participants
Participants brought forth various views on how they choose to use language in a
way that may more accurately reflect how they see and know themselves:
You aren’t a disorder, you have a disorder, or you suffer from a disorder.
But it’s not who I am. I mean, I am so many other things besides having bipolar
disorder. I’m an artist, I’m a computer scientist, I’m a mental health professional
now…
I had a big problem with perhaps the language of diagnosis because the idea of
bipolar disorder was totally new to me when I was diagnosed… And there’s some
people who are very comfortable with being bipolar or labeling themselves
bipolar, and I don’t understand… to me, the key is disorder.
I still like to say, ‘I have bipolar disorder’, so if that means I’m not fully at a point
of acceptance, if it means that I think the language should be more… you could
say, with diabetes, ‘I am diabetic’ or ‘I have diabetes’, but with cancer or heart
disease or some other illnesses there’s no adjective. You don’t say, ‘I am cancer’,
you just have it, you know what I mean?
And the other thing with the language is to say I have bipolar disorder, versus I
am bipolar. I wouldn’t say ‘I am cancer’, or ‘I am heart disease’, or ‘I am foot
fungus’ or anything else. I would say I have those things.
It’s like, could you imagine, OK, somebody who says I’m bipolar, would you
say… I’m cancer?... I can’t relate to people using the word, saying I’m bipolar, I
can’t… then get some help, quit being bipolar, you know?... To me; fight it, solve
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it. So then I would prefer to say I had, I was diagnosed with and I’m under
treatment and I’m doing fine…
The felt limits of a language of diagnosis were also acknowledged:
I think that fact of saying, OK you’re mentally ill, you have depression… more
caused the depression in a lot of times, that labeling, instead of saying you’re
mourning, you know, this is hard for you… I always wanted to deal with the
causes, I didn’t want to just say OK you’re labeled, this is it, take this medication,
that was not… so I don’t know if that’s language, but the language didn’t help.
There are also extensive and, again, various personal and political reasons for the way
individuals choose to use language. Understandably, these decisions are most often made
in relation to others, or to society:
Let me put it this way, we just did a symposium and one of the speakers spoke on
stigma and he said the only way to vanquish stigma is for everyone to come out,
because there are so many people out there that are suffering from depression and
bipolar illness and schizophrenia, and that is to come out. Ahh, that all sounds real
good on paper, but in the real world… people who come to the support group,
people I know, I always advise them not to tell a prospective employer that
they’re bipolar or even that they’re suffering from depression, because that will
stick with them. First of all, they’ll be lucky if they get hired, and secondly, if
they do get hired or if they reveal let’s say to a current boss, something can
happen that in the grand scheme of things would be accepted as a natural reaction,
but if you’re bipolar they see it as a symptom… if you’re bipolar, it’s ‘you went
bipolar on us.’
I think probably if I didn’t have to associate with people, if I was a hermit, I
probably wouldn’t need to say it. But because I am in contact with others, to not
say it, not say those words, would be basically the same as denying I have it.
I think they’re uncomfortable. I don’t know, I think it is the words, I don’t know,
that diagnosis, maybe that name, bipolar, maybe that’s the problem, I don’t know.
So it’s sad because you know what it does is, it’s their own insecurity, but what it
does is that it subconsciously or, basically, they’re extending their shame, like I
should be ashamed.
The more I say it the more comfortable I am with it, and that’s important because
even if you want to talk about your illness and you don’t want to use that word,
well, you’re still then sending, even in your own mind, you’re saying there’s a
stigma attached to that.
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I would say for some people it’s like a connection point. I think so many people
are afraid to talk about it, or admit it, you know, even though they know that’s
something to struggle with. So I think using those words actually helps make it
more real… I think it’s important for people to understand those words, you
know: schizophrenia, major depression, bipolar disorder. I mean, these things are
OK to talk about, and they’re OK, you know, it’s part of life, it’s not something
they’ve done wrong, it’s just that’s who they are or what they’re dealing with. So
I find it’s, it’s a sensitive thing, people react and you never know, and I think
that’s always an apprehension of mine, like you never know how they’re going to
react, but it doesn’t change my willingness to say those words, to talk about it.
The political use of words used interpersonally was a theme that emerged:
It’s sort of like now in an ethnic group, you know like African-Americans can
say, ‘here’s a word you’ve used against me all these years, now we can use it
about ourselves and you can’t hurt us with it anymore’.
Not the words, it’s just the meaning behind the words. It’s like, you know, there’s
an automatic negative. And I don’t know. Is that continual exposure to people, is
it saying that word over and over and over again, will that help? Maybe. I don’t
know how else you would get people used to it.
All of the participants spoke, whether positively or negatively, about “coming out” about
mental illness and likened the importance of that to the “coming out” of gay, lesbian,
bisexual and transgendered individuals.
The relativity of language also emerged; the relevance of how words are used, the
intended meaning of the words as being more important than the words themselves:
T’s depressed, OK, T’s off his wagon, T’s nutso. Those are the kind of terms that
don’t have any meaning. So how they’re used, it could make somebody very
irritated or it could be used as humor… it depends on the intention, it also
depends on the specificity of the definition.
A rose is a rose. And people… I think probably people that have disorders just
don’t like to be called crazy. See, they can call themselves crazy, but they do not
want to be called crazy by someone who means it.
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The Making of Meaning; Where Strength and Support are Found
The making of meaning was revealed not in terms of specific language, but rather,
where individuals found meaning, strength, and support, in living with mental illness.
The importance of a sense of community around dealing with a diagnosis was apparent.
Most often, this was found through support groups, advocacy work, or creative work
within an accepting community:
Being involved in a good support group is paramount to lifting a huge burden off
you, because initially you really do feel like you’re this poor little island in a sea
of mental illness… I did feel a sense of community with the people there. I saw
that there were some people that were obviously not, ah, healthy yet, but they
were striving and working very hard, and I heard a lot of stories that made my
situation seem less ominous.
I want to do well for myself so that I can do well for the organization and the
people that come to us.
Part of the felt acceptance was the group’s openness about their diagnosis:
Because we’re totally open about it, everybody who joins the project, when we
have an exhibit all our names are used. It’s not like a first name or anything, you
know, first name, last name. Everybody is open… so we say it loud, ‘I’m
mentally ill and I’m proud,’ so that’s a different feeling than I had before.
I think I associated with people who were comfortable that they had it, and I
found out that they were just normal people and they had their struggles and I
realized some of their’s were like some of mine and that yeah, maybe I do, you
know… I started focusing on the disorder, rather than on the bipolar, and that
make me more comfortable with it.
It’s been liberating to feel like we can accomplish so much and educate the
public… we’ve just continued to try and get the word out and educate everybody
that, ‘hey, people with mental illness are creative and capable, you know…
Most participants related the importance to them of reading the accounts or
autobiographies of people who had lived, or live, with mental illness. Three of the six
participants spoke in particular about Kay Redfield Jamison:
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I’ve been more embracing of the diagnosis since, for the past ten years, I’ve been
involved with the ***** Project… and I read Touched with Fire by Kay Redfield
Jamison and read her autobiography, and read other artisits’ autobiographies, and
now I’m more embracing of it.
My sister, M, was always looking at all the artists and writers and stuff who had
bipolar disorder. All these geniuses. And thinking that it had some… value and
merit. And so she sort of glorified it almost.
As well, the importance of family, friends, spouses and role models was unanimously
voiced:
Without a role model I might have assumed that I could never work or, you know,
I could be disabled so badly, or be in an out of hospitals so much and end up
homeless, and a lot of people do…
Personal characteristics or attributes, and personal faith, were also felt to be a valuable
aspect of accepting and enduring:
I’m Irish, Irish-American I should say, I was born in the Bronx… something in
me. In spite of the fact that I’m hypomanic or manic-depressive or bipolar or
whatever else, there’s something within me that says… you’re worthwhile, you
know? And I can be depressed and feeling badly about myself, but there’s
something on a deeper level almost, that remained with me to fight… also my
faith.
I think some people are more willing to accept change or accept difficult things
than others… there are people more comfortable with talking about things than
others, that maybe I do feel a good portion of my acceptance and treatment has
been talking about it. So if people are not comfortable speaking, and I don’t mean
like on the podium speaking, I’m talking about in general speaking, I think they
would have a harder time coming to terms with the ramifications and the words…
Suffering is not the final word, suffering is not the final word. That has helped me
tremendously. It doesn’t mean my suffering is less, that it isn’t painful, but that
helps me to know that it’s not the end, and that I’m not alone.
I’ve been to the bottom and I know there’s no other choice, there’s no option but
to accept it…the deeper the bottom, the more readily someone is willing to accept
what they have... so I think part of it is being at the bottom and knowing that you
can only go up, you have to accept it to move up.
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It was also clear how meaning can be found simply in the way that we, as people, and
certainly as allies working in the field, interact with one another. One participant spoke
about the importance of being treated with dignity. This participant described an incident
that communicated a true sense of worth and dignity to him when he was in a vulnerable
and frightening situation:
Dignity. It’s in that. It’s in that priest running up to me in the parking lot in his
robes to hug me.
The Function of Language
Language Sets Apart or “Others”
A more macro-level analysis reveals another vital aspect of language, which is the
way it functions. That is, what it succeeds in doing. Most clearly, it succeeds in setting
things apart from one another because it draws lines and makes distinctions:
OK, and as a rape survivor, when I would tell people about being raped, a lot of
people would either kind of distance themselves in the sense, thinking, it’s
everybody knows this could happen to them but they want to feel like it couldn’t
happen to them; ‘so what did you do wrong, what did you do, what did you do to
cause this?’… everybody wants to kind of think it couldn’t happen to them, and
the same thing with this label of mental illness.
It’s interesting because I think if I were to not use the word bipolar disorder, but if
I were to be talking about it with someone and I just described it, like even with
medical terms; like rapid cycling and mania and if I were to use these words, I
think people would be fine. But as soon as you throw that word in there, bipolar, I
think it changes peoples’… feelings or categorization.
I’m not even sure so much people are afraid of the people as they are of the name,
you know?
The physical internment of the mentally ill is remembered as a means by which to
separate the mentally ill from the rest of society:
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Well, the way they used to control it, they’d put you in a mental institution, that
was the control, they didn’t know how to deal with it, so lock ‘em up… it keeps
the problems out of society’s way so they don’t have to deal with it.
One participant described the way the physical separation and ‘othering’ of the mentally
ill still persists:
And a lot of people do [end up] in long-term care ‘cause they’ve shut down all the
long-term hospitals, and they get placed somewhere like nursing homes. All these
young people, bright young people with mental illnesses, are in nursing homes,
it’s horrible…
Encountering a double standard can be thought of as an illustration of dividing practices
or ‘othering’:
I thought I was gonna grow up and be somebody, you know? And so I was teased
by that, even without me saying it, you know, it was I had that kind of stuff which
could get to mania in the sense that it’s grandiosity, you know, I had that. Um, but
you know, Bill Clinton, when he was in highschool he wanted to be president and
nobody’s saying he’s grandiose because he did it! But, you know, somebody else
who does that, it’s very tricky, because practically everything in there [the DSM],
other than maybe psychotic, you know, a normal person can also do and be
perfectly normal… these are all fairly normal things in isolation, but if you have
them all together and they become a problem, you know, you have a disorder.
If we’re not held to the same standards and held accountable for our actions…
then, you know, we are setting ourselves apart.
One participant spoke about losing friends, specifically after being diagnosed:
I think that they associated with the stigma. I think they felt, I don’t know if they
felt that I would rub off on them or if they felt like they were just done, they don’t
want to deal with that, or learn how to deal with someone. Maybe they didn’t
want to learn to understand.
Other participants echoed thoughts on the stigma attached to a diagnosis of bipolar
disorder:
[Stigma is] ignorance, it’s caused by ignorance. It’s caused by fear. People who
are afraid they could get it, or you know, it’s almost like they act like it could be
contagious. There’s just a lot of ignorance still in the world.
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In a way it puts you in another category in most peoples’ minds, that’s where we
are… there’s an automatic categorization that goes on in peoples’ minds… even I
think people who are familiar, maybe people who are nurses, maybe people who
are doctors, I think there’s an automatic categorization that this person is a
liability.
I think a lot of it in the beginning I did was making assumptions that other people
are me knew that I had this illness, and I self-stigmatized, I was afraid.
All psychology has ever tried to do is categorize people in identifiable groups so
you can break them down in certain sections but the reality is even within the
group no two are alike.
The medication is a very stigmatic thing too, because when you go to the
pharmacist and if you go to a pharmacist and you’re pickin’ up depacote, you
don’t feel embarrassed because that could be for you epilepsy, ok. You go to the
pharmacist and you’re pickin’ up lithium, ain’t nothin’ else for that lithium but
bipolar illness.
A negative feeling towards the felt permanence of the diagnosis was discussed more than
once:
Once you’ve had that diagnosis, you always have that diagnosis. Why can’t it be
in remission?
There were clear views that this setting apart is an extreme disservice to individuals
living with mental illness. However, participants did express hope and thoughts about
how the service delivery system, and the individuals within it, could work towards
bridging that imposed distance:
It needs to be much more human. It needs to be humanized. They need to treat
people with dignity. ‘Cause, you know, just ‘cause I’m not well doesn’t mean I’m
not intelligent or, you know, sensitive, or capable of having a conversation…
What I would hope, eventually, it would become a word that, or a condition,
that’s treated no differently than any other medical condition.
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Language Creates a Dichotomy Between Mental and Physical Illness
The theme of a created dichotomy between mental and physical illness emerged
consistently, and is presumably particularly importance because of the stigma
attached to mental illness:
And it was the split between mental and physical illness and why it’s so
stigmatized, like why having cancer or something else… that’s what really hurts,
that’s something that really needs to be addressed. ‘Cause we are one. A brain
disease, to my mind would just be a label that’s breaking it down even more, like
a physical separating of what really should unite them.
I mean, if we didn’t have the word, or the distinction, mental or physical illness,
then [mental illness] wouldn’t be considered any different than any [physical
illness].
Yeah, it’s kind of overwhelming or something in a way that it shouldn’t really
be… it’s interesting, there’s other things, other symptoms, other illnesses,
physical illnesses that may have psychiatric symptoms and once it’s found to be
caused by a germ or whatever, then it became no longer a psychiatric illness, it
became considered a physical illness. I don’t believe in that divide.
I just think you have to get back to the larger question of mental illness,
differentiating that from physical illness, I think that’s where it’s bullshit, that
distinction, is wrong… let’s look at the bigger picture, the whole idea of mental
versus physical illness is the wrong distinction to begin with.
Much more than a philosophical distinction, the distinction between mental and physical
illness has a profound impact on what treatment looks and feels like:
If I had broken my leg, they can call, I can call. So it’s like, you know, why is this
secrecy necessary, except with the stigma? What else is there? ‘Cause you call or
‘yeah they’re in room such-and-such’ and you get the name and number, and
‘hey, I heard you’re in the hospital, I’m your friend, I want to be there for you,
can I come and visit you,’ but they couldn’t even get through, couldn’t even get
any information, and you think well, that a good thing. But it isn’t. It’s just
stigmatizing. Re-stigmatizing.
Why should somebody be afraid to mention bipolar any more than somebody,
say, well I’ve got cancer… why should it me any more difficult for you and I to
talk about, ah, cancer or personal experiences mentally or physically in terms of
illness and good health?
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Language as Cultural Expression and as Reflections in the Media
Language can be seen as a reflection of cultural values:
It’s so chicken and egg, what’s the cause and the effect, you know? The great
artists like Van Gogh, and some of the writers who committed suicide, Sylvia
Plath and whoever, and you think, well, was it the illness that made them great or
the greatness or the sensitivity or what that made them ill? Or did they just have a
genetic predisposition and it’s just a brain disorder? No, I don’t know, I don’t
really buy that ‘cause it’s so societal, and there’s so much cultural norms of how
people behave and what’s acceptable and what’s not, and in other cultures people
with what’s labeled mental illness in this culture might be a shaman or, you know,
really powerful leaders, and not looked upon as pariah.
Predictably, the media is a powerful purveyor of cultural values. If the media does not
necessarily create the stigma, it all too often succeeds in maintaining it:
I mean, they don’t do shows on, you know, bipolar disorder and how great it, you
know, can be and how people can resolve. You don’t see that in the shows, like
I’m thinking about a law and order episode that was about a person with
schizophrenia. I mean, it never got resolved, I mean, the person was a total
nutcase, and you never saw that the person could be OK once they’re taking their
medicine, you know, you just see them sent to jail and that’s the end and they’re
crazy and thank goodness they’re off the street, that’s all, you know?
I mean, there are a lot of people out there who have bipolar disorder, many of
whom are treated but don’t want to talk about it. And I’m talking about, like,
celebrities. I mean, I wish people would talk about it, you know, ‘cause you only
see, it’s only brought to attention, like in magazines, in TV and movies, the bad
side of it. They use it an explanation, or excuse, or answer to bad behaviors. But if
they’re being treated, why aren’t they talking about it?
The media, if they would quit sensationalizing every time…or how ‘bout this
bipolar teacher who had sex with her twelve year old student, and why is she all
over the news anyway, because she’s gorgeous? …People want to generalize
about these cases that show up in the news, or violent ones… it’s so
sensationalized, it’s so negative in the news, in the media, that people just assume
that we have… everybody has the potential to be violent…
Clearly, these representations have an impact on what it means for an individual to hear a
diagnosis, and how they take it in:
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And the first time I was hospitalized in that period the first thing they said was
bipolar, of course then they said manic depressive because bipolar was not cool
then, and I was just so irate and I was so in denial and I was so ‘you gotta be
kidding me’. I think partially because even though I’d read about manic
depression, I had never really put it with me, you know. It was something that you
usually hear about in a negative context. Some manic depressive person threw
themselves off a bridge, some manic depressive person abused their child, some
manic depressive person ‘yada yada’, so that didn’t connect with me…
Summary
This qualitative phenomenological research study explored the language of
diagnosis, and its perceived impact on individuals diagnosed with bipolar disorder.
Analysis of the data revealed the broad themes of:
1. The participants’ experience of language.
2. Making of meaning, or where strength was found.
3. The function of language.
The participants’ experience of language was further analyzed and revealed the
following themes: (a) language as naming, labeling or categorizing; (b) language as
relating to personal experience; (c) language as relating to acceptance of a diagnosis; and
(d) language as used by the participants.’ The function of language was further analyzed
and revealed the following themes: (a) language sets apart or “others;” (b) language
creates a dichotomy, specifically between mental and physical illness; and (c) language
as cultural expression and as reflected in media representation. These themes point to the
various ways that language may, in part, both impact and create our experiences.
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CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION
This qualitative phenomenological research study examined the ways in which the
language of diagnosis impacts the experience of individuals diagnosed with bipolar
disorder. In this chapter the results of the study will be discussed in relationship to each
other in to prior work.
Analysis of the data revealed the following broad themes:
1. The participants’ experience of language.
2. The making of meaning, or where strength and support were found.
3. The function of language.
The participants’ experience of language was further analyzed to reveal the
following themes: (a) language as naming, labeling or categorizing; (b) language as
relating to personal experience; (c) language as it relates to acceptance of a diagnosis; and
(d) language as it is used by the participants. The function of language was further
analyzed to reveal the following themes: (a) language sets apart, or ‘others;’ (b) language
creates a dichotomy, specifically between mental and physical illness; and (c) language
as cultural expression and as reflected in the media.
An interesting and highly relevant complexity in trying to relate the theoretical
underpinnings of this research study with its data collection and analysis was the use of
language to discuss the impact of language. This complexity is articulated by Butler
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(1997), who recognizes that “… we exercise the force of language even as we seek to
counter its force, caught up in a bind that no act of censorship can undo” (p.1). There are
numerous issues for further discussion that were illuminated by this research study.
The Participants’ Experience of Language
Language as Naming, Labeling or Categorizing
Participants in this study had distinct reactions to a diagnosis of bipolar disorder.
In part, they reacted strongly because of the felt seriousness of the diagnosis. However,
there was also a felt sense of relief because the diagnosis offered an explanation for, or an
answer to, their experience. Naming, in this sense, succeeded in providing some context
for their experience and in this sense was felt to be normalizing. Naming the experience
eased a sense of guilt and confusion about what they had been experiencing in their lives.
This view offers a potentially positive aspect of classifying individuals; where, by doing
so, one becomes part of a group, a specific population, instead of an individual suffering
on their own and without explanation. On the level of the individual, this would seem to
contrast Foucault’s (1987) notion that as society “diagnoses the illness, it exclude the
patient.” (p. 63). The personal experience of suffering on one’s own, and without
explanation, begs for a context wherein it can be felt that one is not actually alone.
This finding is also a flip side to Everett’s (2000) coin, who states that: “I and my
colleagues were unable to provide … supports and, instead, translated the patients’
expression of suffering into a psychiatric diagnosis…” (p.197); this description describes
the recognition of suffering and the psychiatric diagnosis as being mutually exclusive, in
that a clinician would do one or the other. However, the responses of a few participants
may motivate us to question the necessity of this mutual exclusivity. Indeed, we may
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consider that there are positive aspects to the naming of experience which language
allows, while also being aware that there are negative consequences to this process and
the system that it entails.
‘Bipolar disorder’ is a specific name, label or category that, for the participants of
this study, held predominantly negative and serious connotations. While there were
differing views about the seriousness of the labels manic depression (the majority of
participants having been previously diagnosed with manic depression) versus bipolar
disorder, bipolar disorder was felt to have a much greater emotional weight than does
depression (again, the majority of participants were also previously diagnosed with
depression).
There was also the expressed notion that with certain kinds of labels, the specific
word used does not always matter. In the case of bipolar disorder versus manic
depression, it was felt that the meaning carried over, despite the intention of disarming
the diagnosis of its stigmatic connotations. In this way, language itself seems vulnerable
to the previously created meaning. From this, we may hypothesize that language does not
have the agency one may think. Rather, it is the meaning, the circumstances that a word
implies, that may in fact have the agency.
This subtly echoes the findings by Corrigan, Watson, Heyrman, Warpinski,
Gracia, Slopen, and Hall (2005) that current legislation regarding the liberty, protection
from discrimination and privacy rights of the mentally ill only takes into account a
diagnosis, and nothing more individual or particular. So, if language itself is vulnerable to
the cultural values that create it, we may infer that the individuals who are subject to it,
labeled by it, are all the more vulnerable.
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Despite the complexities that ‘naming the illness’ entails, participants in this study
also acknowledged that there is a general inclination towards, and a usefulness in, naming
what is apparent and not being afraid to do so. Further, there is even something liberating
about doing so.
Language as Relating to Personal Experience
The participants in this study related that an exploration of how language impacts
individuals does in some way depend on the personal experience of that individual. The
language of diagnosis can be denied as easily as anything one wishes to, or needs, to
deny. In this way, what you are able to hear depends on your personal experience, i.e.
whether or not language resonates with one’s own personal experience. Acceptance of
the language of diagnosis also depends on the degree to which one has felt understood by
the clinician and how much the language conveys that understanding of personal
experience.
Analysis in this vein illuminates a consistently felt complexity in this study,
which is that of examining something as intellectualized as language when speaking with
individuals about their lives. This being said, it was clear that there is a positive regard
for the language of diagnosis when it was felt to reflect personal experience, and
therefore that language has more power when it accounts for personal experience. This
seems to reflect Hilary Putnam’s view, as cited by Hacking (1999), that we negotiate and
renegotiate our notion of reality as it relates to our personal experience, “as our language
and life develops” (p. 101). This finding is congruent with Lakoff and Johnson’s (2003)
statement that “meaning is always meaning to a person” (p. 228), and that coherence is
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constructed in relation to personal understanding and experience. As presented in the
Findings, this is illustrated by one participant’s stating:
All I heard was random cycling, short cycling, ups and downs, unexplained, no
reason, and I’m like, I can’t relate to this, you know, I don’t think I have that, but
now I hear more about triggers… ‘triggers’ is helpful, ‘reactive’ is helpful. I
mean, if it’s true. For somebody that it’s not, it’s not.
When aspects of the diagnostic language reflect personal experience it is felt to be
helpful, it speaks to the individual and moves toward affirming their experience.
We can infer from the Findings as well that while language does not initially
create experience, it is undoubtedly an expression of experience. Perhaps the relating of
experience, through language, changes the experience into something else by being one
of the means by which the experience can be translated into something shared. Language
does not initially create the experience (for example, Lacan may agree that the breast is
experienced more simply, more intuitively.), but that language is attributed to experience
(as in the mother-child, as in the therapeutic encounter, and as with diagnosis), and it is
then that it becomes part of conveying experience, articulating experience. Further, its
meaning is in the relating of experience, through language, which is at once a relief and a
recognition, and is simultaneously alienating; it sets us apart from the experience.
This study did at least reflect that language offers recognition to us, and one that
is felt, truly, to be important. It is particularly effectively in demonstrating that language
resonates when it is felt to reflect personal experience. As clinicians, we may see this as
an invitation to broaden the language that we use so that it can resonate whenever
possible with individual experience.
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Language as Relating to Acceptance of a Diagnosis
We see reflections of Lakoff and Johnson (2003) again when we look at the ways
in which language relates to an acceptance of a diagnosis or, conversely, relates to the
non-acceptance of a diagnosis; “We understand our experience directly when we see it as
being structured coherently in terms of gestalts that have emerged directly from
interaction with and in our environment.” (p. 230). This follows from a discussion of the
importance of language reflecting personal experience, and was taken further by
participants who related an acceptance of the language of diagnosis to acceptance of the
diagnosis itself.
If language resonates, it is because it reflects our experience. As such, we can
understand it in a personal way and are all the more willing to take it on as our own, or as
a reflection of our very selves. Some of the participants in this study found that the
language of diagnoses may well attempt to describe what they were experiencing, but that
they were nonetheless hesitant to take on the label because it seemed such a narrow
description. Denying the language, and denying its attribution to the self, parallels the
denial of the diagnosis and all that the diagnosis implies for an individual, particularly its
implications within the context of Western society:
Denying the diagnosis itself, but more denying the need for any kind of
medication…
One participant, on the other hand, considered taking on the language of diagnosis
as deeply important to her by accepting and living with her diagnosis.
I really truly do not believe that people can accept their illness until they can
accept what it’s called and the ramifications, the words, all the words, associated
with it.

50

For clinicians, this may highlight the importance of making use of the language
that resonates with individuals, lest we be complicit in their denial of aspects of their
experience. The participants of this study reflected the idea that to state out loud and
articulate, a diagnosis of bipolar disorder in relation to self is recognition, on a different
level, than mere experience, or ‘what one knows.’ One participant in particular held that
taking on a language of diagnosis, or more specifically a label of bipolar, was indicative
of accepting the condition as part of one’s life. The implication is that if one is not
accepting of the language of diagnosis, one is in denial, perhaps not of their experience,
but of its formalization within the mental health system. We must be clear that the denial
or acceptance of the language of diagnosis is the denial or acceptance of a particular
language, and not, as Foucault (1987) reminds us, the “language of everyday life” (p. 67)
within which the mentally ill were once contained.
Language as Used by Participants
The power of using language is stated by Christopher Bollas (1987) when he
writes that “speaking becomes associated with the transformation of the self” (p. 194).
This association implies (a) that one speaks and, (b) the way one speaks, has the potential
to transform the way one sees her/himself and, in fact, who they are. Part of what was
illuminated, in a preliminary way, by this study were the various ways participants use
language in an intentional way to demark or illustrate the role a received diagnosis plays
in their life.
Participants in this study, for the most part, drew a strong distinction between
saying ‘I am bipolar’ and ‘I have bipolar disorder.’ The former was felt by some
participants to be somewhat diminishing; a label not capable of portraying an individual’s
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identity. The latter was felt by most participants to more appropriately convey that
bipolar disorder was an aspect of their lives but does not constitute their identity.
However, it was felt by one participant to illustrate ownership of the label and an
important tool for self-advocacy.
Language was also found to be particularly important in relation to others, and
within a given society. This theme emerged in this study, with participants articulating
their awareness of their different use of language depending on who they were talking to.
For example, participants largely viewed “coming out” about their mental illness as
important in personal relationships, but were more divided when it came to “coming out”
to employers. The function of language on a societal level may be seen as more complex,
with more uncertain implications. It was acknowledged that the way one presents oneself
to larger society is not necessarily the same as the way one would think of oneself in
isolation, in their own mind:
I think probably if I didn’t have to associate with people, if I was a hermit, I
probably wouldn’t need to say it. But because I’m in contact with others, to not
say it, not say those words, would be basically the same as denying that I have it.
So the societal use of language is illustrated. This relates to both Lacanian and
Foucauldian notions, where language necessarily alienates us from ourselves while
providing a framework for engaging with others, but also functions as a tool of society’s
deep power structures.
The idea that language necessarily alienates us from ourselves while providing a
framework for engaging with others was articulated when participants described the
importance of establishing community and connection with individuals who may share
similar experiences. Similar to the sense of relief felt by being diagnosed, owning a
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particular language of diagnosis can facilitate a sense of empowerment for individuals
who have received a diagnosis of bipolar disorder.
Both the political use of words and the relativity of words were illustrated by the
participants. Words can be used by an individual to further important political gains, or to
create new understanding. This was described by one participant using the example of the
use of the ‘n-word’ within the African-American community to alter the impact of the
word through conscious re-appropriation. However, language can also be used against an
individual to further opposing political gains, as illustrated by the participants’
recognizing that how specific words are used, and the intention behind their use, is often
more important that the word itself.
For clinicians, these findings may inspire us to explore the specific meanings
individuals attribute to the words they use, and to more deeply examine the relation of
these individual meanings to the meanings attributed to words in dominant discourse.
The Making of Meaning and Location of Strength/Support
Lakoff and Johnson (2003) state, “Our implicit and typically unconscious
conceptions of ourselves and the values that we live by are perhaps most strongly
reflected in the little things we do over and over, that is, in the casual rituals that have
emerged spontaneously in our daily lives.” (p. 235). With this in mind, one way of
examining ‘the making of meaning’ with participants in this study was to explore where
they have found strength and support, and the activities that have become part of their
daily lives as they live with a diagnosis of a mental illness.
The participants of this study found strength in the support of family (their spouse
and/or children in particular) and friends. It is at least understood that personal meaning-
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making is more possible when one feels supported and empowered to create that meaning
for oneself. Participants also described the importance of being part of a community of
individuals who share similar experiences, in this case a diagnosis of bipolar disorder.
For one participant, this community revolved around the creative pursuit of creating and
displaying art together. A common thread between these communities created around
shared experience was the willingness for the community to state that part of their
identity was being diagnosed with bipolar disorder. This was felt to be freeing and
empowering.
In one way, this may lead us to see that meaning is often made collectively. At
least, that a collective (whether its family and friends, or individuals who share certain
experiences) may make a personal interpretation of meaning more ready, partly because
it is shared.
A previously internalized language of the self also had an impact on how
participants felt they coped with, or made meaning of, a diagnosis of bipolar disorder.
This may include temperament and personality traits as well as individual intrapsychic
structure. In addition, the reaction of others is an important aspect of making meaning of
one’s diagnosis. We are in relation to others. Being treated with dignity and reiterating
the human aspects of the individual, conveys a powerful sense of individual worth and
intrinsic value. As clinicians, it is important to hold in mind that daily interactions do
inform the meaning individuals make of their experience, but we also need to be
insightful about the strengths and capacities that individuals bring into the room.
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The Function of Language
Language Sets Apart or ‘Others’
Participants in this study did convey a sense that language does effectively make a
distinction; that it does drawn a line between those diagnosed with mental illness, bipolar
disorder, and those who have not been diagnosed with a mental illness. Participants
communicated the idea that a reason for this distinction is a fear of mental illness which
results from the stigma surrounding it. This illustrates a tendency, or a need, to identify
oneself not by what one is but by what one is not. This exposes an interesting aspect of
our cultural or societal psyche and the anxiety therein. Despite all of the inclinations we
have acknowledged towards naming, and the positive aspects of this naming, it is also
understood that naming, or labeling, does by its nature separate things, and is, by its
nature, divisionary. One participant makes clear that there is a felt distinction in peoples’
reaction to her illness when she speaks of it descriptively versus when she labels it, or
gives it a name:
It’s interesting because I think if I were to not use the word bipolar disorder, but if
I were to be talking about it with someone and I just described it, like even with
medical terms; like rapid cycling and mania and if I were to use these words, I
think people would be fine. But as soon as you throw that word in there, bipolar, I
think it changes peoples’… feelings or categorization.
The same participant made the poignant comment, “I’m not even sure so much people are
afraid of the people as they are of the name, you know?” The ways in which
“classifications of people interact with people classified” (Hacking, 2004, p. 277) were
explored, these comments may lead us to wonder whether part of this interaction is that
classifications can inspire a reaction of fear towards those who are “classified.” We can
see this as a way in which individuals with a diagnosis of a mental illness are ‘set apart.’
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The physical separation of those with mental illness from the rest of society has
historically been an acceptable way of drawing the same distinction that the mere
classification of mental illness may imply. Importantly, mental health policy particularly
since the Community Mental Health Act in 1963 has indicated a certain shift away from
institutionalization towards greater inclusiveness. On a policy level, this is an important
change in perspective. We may question how this change in perspective serves
individuals who are living with mental illness day to day. Further, and in terms of
considering the language of diagnosis, we may ask whether our need to categorize fulfills
a parallel function to the historic physical separation of those diagnosed with a mental
illness from those undiagnosed.
Foucault’s (1987) question remains a pertinent and fascinating one; we wonder
how “our society expresses itself in those morbid forms in which it refuses to recognize
itself?” (p. 63). This question illustrates the reverse of Hacking’s earlier cited question
regarding the interaction between classification and the classified individual. Foucault
wonders what the act of classifying illustrates about those who classify, and even more
broadly, a society that classifies. Most immediately, we may wonder whether this
inclination to classify, and further entrench concepts of mental illness in a medical model,
is an illustration of mass denial and sublimation of our common fragility and
vulnerability. Again, we see our tendency to identify what we are not, and act that out;
perhaps in response to the anxiety of not being able to define precisely what we are.
We may wonder whether it is inherently the case that the process of ‘othering’ is a
negative one. Exploring this entails recognition of the processes’ cultural or societal
construction, i.e. the fundamental function of this process may vary between cultures. It
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can generally be said that in dominant Western culture when we “other” we usually set
aside and, more often, set down the ‘other.’ This is an important clarification because it is
not necessarily the case that classifying, or defining, or differentiating, is a negative
process. Indeed, it is a necessary one.
An interesting question to ask is whether we can we see the diagnosis of a mental
illness as a site of Jean Laplanche’s ‘primary address’. For Laplanche, as discussed by
Butler (2005), the “primary address which overwhelms” is both an impingement and a
necessity (p. 71). Although the condition of passivity is vastly different between an infant
and an adult, is there a way we could see these as parallel processes? If seen as parallel
process, the individual who receives a diagnosis “enters the world,” even if just for a
moment, like the infant who “enters the world given over from the start to a language and
to a series of signs, broadly construed, that begin to structure an already operative mode
of receptivity and demand.” (Butler, 2005, p. 77).And, “From this primary experience of
having been given over from the start, an “I” subsequently emerges.” (Butler, 2005, p.
77). These ideas, far beyond the scope of this study, provide just a hint of a frame with
which we can view the simultaneously experienced positive and negative aspects of
diagnosis. Butler (2005) reminds us of the paradox that “the power imposed upon one is
the power that animates one’s emergence.” (p. 198). It seems as though it would be a
positive and empowering step if mental health clinicians recognized and nurtured this
paradox in relation to a diagnosis of mental illness, where it may not imply a chronically
stigmatizing label but would more often allow for the emergence of the individual.
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Language Dichotomy between Mental and Physical Illness
The dichotomizing language of mental versus physical illness is an interesting
theme that consistently emerged throughout the interviews with the participants and
seemed to reflect a broad, though culturally specific, philosophical stance separating the
mind and body. Although not reviewed previously in the Literature Review of this study,
this philosophical perspective is specifically a Western world one.
The subsequent stigmatizing of mental illness has perhaps been part of the reason
for individuals diagnosed with mental illness to become interested in challenging this
distinction. One participant clearly states that “that distinction is wrong… the whole idea
of mental versus physical illness is the wrong distinction to begin with.”
The distinction between mental and physical health and illness has far-reaching
consequences for the treatment of individuals as well. Participants found that within the
health care system the created dichotomy between mental and physical illness serves to
further stigmatize, or “re-stigmatize,’ individuals receiving treatment.
The definition of mental health introduced in the Literature Review as “the
absence of mental illness” was also reflected by participants who felt that this
dichotomizing definition has permeated their experience. Mental health implies a lack of
mental illness. Conversely, mental illness implies a lack of mental health. This is
consistent both with the participants’ experience and with the theme of defining what one
is by defining what one is not. Part of the dichotomy between physical and mental illness
is a felt difference in what a particular diagnosis means. Physical illnesses were not as
consistently felt to imply a chronic illness. A physical illness may be treated and
disappear, no longer being part of how an individual is expected to define themselves.
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Even a severe physical illness, like cancer, may go into remission. Mental illness, on the
other hand, was felt to imply permanence far more often than physical illness. In this
context, being diagnosed with a mental illness has come to imply permanent and chronic
illness and, by extension, chronic stigmatization.
The fact that mental health policy perspectives are not often oriented towards the
hope of recovery can be seen as echoed in the participants’ questioning why it is that a
diagnosis implies permanence and asking, “Why can’t it be in remission?” In other
words, why is it felt to be such a chronic and encompassing label? This is a particularly
pertinent and important question to consider when we examine our conception of our
work with individuals in the mental health care system.
Language as Cultural Expression and Reflections in the Media
The participants of this study unanimously echoed that media representations of
mentally ill individuals are negative and stigmatizing. This demonizing process was felt
by the participants to be profoundly demoralizing and demeaning. Coverdale and Nairn’s
(2006) findings that negative representations of mental illness in the media served to
“segregate, alienate and denigrate” (p. 86) the mentally ill character, provides an
example, consistently reiterated, of how mentally ill individuals are treated and
stigmatized in our society. One participant revealed an important point in remembering a
particular representation of a schizophrenic individual on a television program where the
crisis “never got resolved… and you never saw that the person could be OK.” This is a
poignant illustration of the notion of the mentally ill individual being in perpetual crisis,
uncontrollable and untreatable, and again, the chronic or permanent nature of a diagnosis
and the resulting stigma.
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Porter (2002) acknowledges that the process of stigmatizing “involves projecting
onto an individual or group judgments as to what is inferior, repugnant, or disgraceful”
(p. 62). We see these representations in various forms of media, and the media is
undoubtedly informed by dominant cultural values. One participant in particular
acknowledged the cultural relativity of these representations, where “what’s labeled
mental illness in this culture might be a shaman… and not looked upon as pariah” in
another culture. We may also see in media representations of individuals with a mental
illness an answer to Foucault’s (1987) question concerning the ways “our society
expresses itself in those morbid forms in which it refuses to recognize itself.” (p. 63). It
would be a valuable transformation for us to recognize that more than seeing
representations of others in denigrating media representations, we more accurately see
ourselves and the qualities of ourselves we collectively wish to disavow.
Summary
It may in some ways appear that this study hints at a question of the social
construction of mental illness. However, it is more so an examination of the relationship
between language and meaning; between language and understanding; and between
language and experience. The initial purpose of this study was to consider a few theories
about the role and power of language and the experience of individuals diagnosed with
bipolar disorder. Attempting to elicit experience that relates to a somewhat abstract
notion of ‘language,’ and language as viewed by Jacques Lacan and Michel Foucault,
proved to be difficult and, indeed, beyond the capabilities of this researcher. However,
the process of interviewing individuals about their experience with mental illness has
illuminated a much richer reality, where language is challenged by personal experience.
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That being said, there are potentially very interesting connections to be made between
language as it is experienced and the impact of a language of diagnosis on diagnosed
individuals.
Limitation of Study
Although this research study contributes to the knowledge base regarding
language and individuals with a diagnosis of bipolar disorder, due to the small sample
size generalizability of the findings to the larger population is limited. There were
limitations in terms of participant recruitment because of the population’s relative
vulnerability and the researcher’s lack of connections or ‘rootedness’ in the city where
the research was conducted.
As well, it is acknowledged that because participants were recruited
predominantly through agencies that are involved in a significant amount of advocacy
work, they may represent a particular perspective in terms of their acceptance of their
diagnosis. Participants’ involvement in these organizations may also imply a certain level
of social support. The participants were also each interested and able to talk about their
experience of being diagnosed, and self-reportedly fit the criteria of being in current
“stable mental and emotional health.” This was an important ethical consideration, but
does nonetheless raise questions concerning this study’s sample’s maximum variation.
It is also important to note that participants were relatively well-educated, and
predominantly middle-class, middle-aged and Caucasian. A more racially, ethnically and
socio-economically diverse sample would potentially have produced more varied data, in
terms of expressed themes and opinions, which could be generalized to the diverse larger
population that is prevalent in society today.
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An interesting complexity of this study which may also be a limitation was the
necessary use of language to discuss the impact of language.
Implications for Practice
This study illuminates some important themes for social work practitioners.
Considering the vast system that we are often working within and the ever-present power
structures and dynamics therein, being serious about the language we use is as
consistently difficult as it is important. Increasing awareness about the various ways that
the language we use impacts individuals and is taken in by them is a worthy
consideration.
A vital finding was of the importance of participants feeling understood as a
means by which they could work on the acceptance of their diagnosis of a major mental
illness. For participants, this meant feeling heard, but also hearing language that
resonated with their experience. This finding may highlight to practitioners the
importance of using a more broad and personalized language when discussing a diagnosis
with their clients. As we aim to root interpretations in the language of the individual’s
story, we could also aim to discuss, and name, an individual’s experience with mental
illness in a way that reflects their own language. Further we could make use of this
broader language to explore individual experience and individuals’ understanding and
acceptance of their own experience. It should come as no surprise that it is important to
explore the meaning individuals attribute to their words and their descriptions and it is
important to attempt to understand as well how individual meanings relate to dominant
discourse.
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A further implication of this study is for clinicians to keep in mind, and work
with, the paradox of naming experience as it is simultaneously necessary, fundamentally
alienating, and full of potential for individual emergence. It is also important for
clinicians to be aware of language that dichotomizes and the impact this has on the
individuals with whom we work.
Clinicians should take seriously the notion of being oriented towards a hope of
recovery for the individuals diagnosed with mental illness, so that a diagnosis of mental
illness is not felt to be a sentence of certain chronic stigmatization.
A final implication of this study is for clinicians to be aware of their own
vulnerability to dominant discourse and its perpetual representation in various media. We
need to check our own assumptions about illness and health, and be aware that in our
work with individuals our assumptions are inevitably communicated to the individuals
with whom we work. Being treated with dignity was a poignant theme brought up by one
participant. Individuals with mental illness must always be treated with dignity and
respect; acting out of a sense of fundamental human dignity is a call to every person and
most especially to clinicians in the mental health field.
Implications for Research
The aim of future research may be to conduct a longitudinal study that includes
more in-depth interviewing with a variety of participants in order to draw out in a more
intimate way what the felt impact of diagnostic language. These methods may allow for
the themes that emerge to be more thoroughly explored and reflected on by participants.
Further research may also seek more diverse participation, which would introduce
unexplored themes.
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Further research may also include interviewing practitioners to explore their view
of the language that they use and the ways in which they consider it and its impact.
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Appendix A
Informed Consent Form

Dear Potential Participant,
My name is Kate Freeman and I am conducting this research study through Smith
College in Northampton Massachusetts, where I am a student in the Master of Social
Work (MSW) Program.
I am interested in exploring the impact of the language of diagnosis on individuals
living with bipolar disorder. Specifically, this study is asking: 1) How did you hear this
diagnosis, and what did it mean to you at the time? 2) Have you thought about how the
language of this diagnosis impacted you? 3) Are there ways that you have used to
language to counteract that impact? 4) What does this diagnosis mean to your life now?
The data from these interviews will be used for my MSW thesis and for possible
presentation and publication. My study is called: “The impact and meaning of language
for individuals living with bipolar I-II disorder.”
The criteria for participation in this study are: 1) diagnosis with bipolar I or II
disorder, three or more years ago, 2) 18 yrs of age or over, and 3) English-speaking, 4)
you are currently is a stable mental and emotional situation in terms of your mental
illness. If you voluntarily agree to be interviewed about your experience, you will be
asked to fill a short demographic questionnaire before we will talk together. The
interview will be an hour long and will take place at an agreed upon time between
February-April 2007. The interviews will be audio-taped and transcribed.
There may be some risk to individuals who participate in this research study.
Some participants may experience emotional difficulty when they discuss their
experience with mental illness. For this reason, there is a List of Resources attached to
this form, with the names and numbers of professionals who can aid you if you
experience any emotional difficulty throughout this process. However, it is also
anticipated that this project will help people become aware of how language, especially
the language of diagnoses, affects peoples’ lives. It may also give you a chance to think
about language and how you’ve used it to get where you are, or what you would change
about it.
Your confidentiality will be protected by the following measures (all in
compliance with Federal Guidelines):
1) No names will be attached to the data or transcripts.
2) The tapes of the interviews will be kept in a locked strong-box, and will be
taken out when they’re being transcribed by me. They will be kept locked up for a
period of 3 years and then destroyed.
3) My research advisor will not have access to any identifying information on the
interview data.
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4) All Consent Forms will be kept separate from the interview data and linked
through a randomly chosen code number.
5) As a participant, you have the right to i) decline to answer any question, ii) to
end the interview at any time and iii) can withdraw from the study at any point up
until May 15, 2007. If you choose to withdraw from the study prior to this date,
all materials pertaining to you will be destroyed immediately.
6) When the information is summarized in the research study, the stories will be
disguised and your real name will never be used.
Always remember, participation in this project is voluntary.
Please feel free to ask me any questions, and thank you for participating in this
study:
Kate Freeman 773-489-7916
kfreeman@smith.edu

YOUR SIGNATURE INDICATES THAT YOU HAVE READ AND UNDERSTAND
THE ABOVE INFORMATION AND THAT YOU HAVE HAD THE OPPORTUNITY
TO ASK QUESTIONS ABOUT THE STUDY, YOUR PARTICIPATION, AND YOUR
RIGHTS AND THAT YOU AGREE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE STUDY.

Participant’s Signature: ____________________

Date: _______________

Researcher’s Signature: ____________________

Date: _______________

PLEASE KEEP A COPY OF THIS FORM FOR YOUR RECORDS.

69

Appendix B
Recruitment Flier

‘Language and the making of meaning
For individuals diagnosed with bipolar’
A Qualitative Research Study
I am seeking to interview individuals who have been diagnosed with
bipolar to explore:
(1) the way you experienced the language of that diagnosis
(2) how you have used language to make meaning from that
diagnosis, and in your life.
You meet the inclusion criteria for this study if you:
o Are 18 years of age or older
o Have been diagnosed with bipolar 3 or more years ago
o Are currently in stable mental and emotional health
o And are interested in talking about your experience

Please contact Kate Freeman (Master of Social Work
Intern) at 773‐489‐7916
or kfreeman@email.smith.edu
Interviews will take place in March and April, 2007 and will be one hour in
length.
Participation in this study is completely voluntary and your confidentiality will
be protected.
And thank you for your interest!
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Appendix C
Demographic Survey

Participant: [number code]
Date of Birth: ____/____/______

Age: ____
Gender: _____
Race/ethnicity: _______________
Religion: _____
Approx. Annual Gross Income: _____
Education (highest level completed): _________

Number of years since being diagnosed with bipolar disorder: _____

71

Appendix D
Interview Guide
Script for clarifying the theme of language at the beginning of the interview:
As I’ve mentioned, I’m doing this study about language and the making of meaning for
individuals who’ve been diagnosed with bipolar disorder. I want to clarify what that
means before we begin. What I’m looking at is the language used to convey the diagnosis
and how those terms, or words, were taken in by you; how you experienced them. I’m
wondering about the ways in which language, or words, create certain meanings for us.
Do you have any questions about this before we begin?

What was that process like when you were diagnosed; where were you, who was talking
to you about it?
Do you remember what words were used?
What do you remember about your reaction?
What did you think and feel?
How did you hear the words?
Where did you go/who did you tell?
Can you say some more about what it meant to you to be diagnosed?
What words would you use to describe that?
[Going back to before you were diagnosed, do you remember your preconceptions about
what bipolar is?
Do you remember, or have ideas about, where you had gotten those ideas, or formed
those preconceptions?]
Do you have ideas about the way any preconceptions of what bipolar is affected how you
reacted to this term, and being diagnosed with it?
Or made it harder or easier to understand what it means to your personal
experience?
Tell me a bit about the process after that? After being diagnosed?
-what words come to mind to describe how you felt about yourself and you
future?
-were there things that happened in your life as a result; in terms of relationships,
employment, etc.?
-do you feel there were things you had to work at to regain (again, perhaps in
terms of relationships, employment, etc.)?
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30-35 min.
Is there a way that you feel you’ve created meaning from your experience of being
diagnosed with bipolar?
Do you think there’s a way that you’ve used language to redefine, or reinterpret, this
experience; a way that you’ve described it to yourself, and what it means to you, that has
been helpful?
5-10 min
And this is maybe like those dream questions: If you could write the DSM, (would you
do it?), how would you describe/define bipolar disorder, and what would you call it?
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Appendix E
Agency Letter of Permission

March 01, 2007.
Smith College
School for Social Work
Lilly Hall
Northampton, MA 01063
To Whom It May Concern:
[Agency name] gives permission for Kate Freeman to locate her research in this agency.
We do not have a Human Subjects Review Board and, therefore, request that Smith
College School for Social Work’s (SSW) Human Subject Review Committee (HSR)
perform a review of the research proposed by Kate Freeman. Thesholds Psychiatric
Rehabilitation Center will abide by the standards related to the protection of all
participants in the research approved by SSW HSR Committee and will retain all
responsibility for the individuals involved in the study.
Sincerely,

[Agency Director]
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Appendix F
Human Subjects Review Committee: Approval Letter
February 14, 2007
Kate Freeman
2215 West Belden Avenue
Chicago, IL 60647
Dear Kate,
Your revised materials have been reviewed and all is now in order. We are able to give
final approval to your study, with the understanding that you will obtain permission
letters from any Organization where you recruit before you contact your participants and
that you will send us copies of these permission letters.
Please note the following requirements:
Consent Forms: All subjects should be given a copy of the consent form.
Maintaining Data: You must retain signed consent documents for at least three (3) years past
completion of the research activity.
In addition, these requirements may also be applicable:
Amendments: If you wish to change any aspect of the study (such as design, procedures,
consent forms or subject population), please submit these changes to the Committee.
Renewal: You are required to apply for renewal of approval every year for as long as the study is
active.
Completion: You are required to notify the Chair of the Human Subjects Review Committee
when your study is completed (data collection finished). This requirement is met by completion
of the thesis project during the Third Summer.

Good luck with your project. Another good quote, but I can’t remember who said it, is
“words create worlds”.
Sincerely,

Ann Hartman, D.S.W.
Chair, Human Subjects Review Committee
Cc: Marian Harris, Research Advisor
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